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OF THE CONDITIONAL FEE AS A
RESPONSE TO LAWYERS, BANKERS
AND LOOPHOLES
CLAIRE HILL & RICHARD PAINTERt
I. INTRODUCTION
Crises inevitably bring cries for new legislation, and the 2008 financial
crisis was no exception. Dodd-Frank' is approximately 850 pages long, and
the regulations it contemplates will be voluminous as well.
There are radically differing views as to whether Dodd-Frank took the
right approach, and whether it will be successful or even beneficial. But
even the most optimistic scenario leaves a significant problem unaddressed.
One important cause of the crisis was that some banks and their lawyers
had been looking for-and finding-clever ways to honor the letter of the
law while violating its spirit, including by "pushing the envelope" as far as
it will go (and in some cases, further). The legal opinion rendered in
Lehman Brothers' Repo 105 transaction, discussed more fully below, is but
one example of the type of lawyering that gave clients what they wanted in
the short term while ignoring the true meaning of the law. We call this type
of lawyering "loophole lawyering."
This type of lawyer behavior presents a significant challenge for
regulation. Rules-based approaches are of limited value. Indeed, the
"better"-the more specific-the rule, the better a roadmap it may provide
for finding loopholes. Standards-based regulation could be more effective,
but ultimately, it has significant limitations. In the business context,
predictability is highly valued, including by courts. Predictability and
broad standards are in considerable tension, insofar as the standards' reach
is only determined ex post, after the conduct occurs. Moreover, once
tHill is Professor and James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, University of Minnesota
Law School; Painter is S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. Thanks to participants in the American University Business
Law Review symposium on Law, Finance and Accountability After Financial Reform.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Public Law
No: 111-203, 12 Stat. 1376 (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5301) (Supp. IV 2010).
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standard-based regulations are interpreted, they become more rule-like, and
hence more vulnerable to avoidance using loophole lawyering.
In this essay, we make a concrete proposal to limit the extent to which
lawyers facilitate problematic transactions of the sort that contributed to,
and may have caused, the financial crisis. We propose that the fees of
securities lawyers and perhaps other regulatory lawyers such as banking
lawyers be "conditional." If the client became insolvent and was found to
have materially violated the relevant regulations in the period leading up to
insolvency, outstanding legal fees would not be payable and any fees paid
to the lawyers by the client during the period of the violation would be
disgorged. A finding of legal malpractice or other fault on the part of the
lawyer would not be necessary, nor would proof that the violation caused
the insolvency be required.
Constraints on bad lawyer behavior in this area are quite limited. First,
existing malpractice law discourages lawyers from giving incompetent
legal advice, but only to a limited extent: the doctrine of in pari delicto
makes it difficult for bankruptcy trustees to assert claims against lawyers,
accountants and other professional service providers in many jurisdictions
including, most notably, New York.2 A bankrupt entity that became
bankrupt due in part to its wrongful conduct cannot proceed against those
who helped the entity act wrongfully; thus, the bankrupt entity's estate
cannot assert a claim that the bankrupt could not have asserted. Second,
lawyers will very rarely be liable for their client's securities fraud. The
federal courts have held that aiders and abettors of securities fraud 3 and
even co-conspirators 4 cannot be sued by injured investors. It will be almost
impossible to sue lawyers as primary violators in their clients' frauds; in
2011, the Supreme Court defined the category of primary violator very
narrowly.5 Third, bar disciplinary authorities rarely bring charges against
securities and banking lawyers. Fourth, while the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has been given authority in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) to promulgate professional responsibility rules for securities
lawyers, 6 and did enact the up-the-ladder reporting rule that Congress
mandated in SOX (this provision requires securities lawyers to report
2 See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950, 958-59 (N.Y. 2010) (applying
principles of in pari delicto to bar a trustee's suit against professional services
providers to a failed entity).
' E.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,177-80
(1994).
4 E.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153, 166-67
(2008).
Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301-02 (2011).
6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
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securities law violations, breaches of fiduciary duty and similar violations
to the board of directors of a client if lower-level reporting does not result
in an appropriate response to the violation)7 the SEC has not promulgated
additional rules to address the problem of loophole lawyering. Furthermore,
there have been few if any SEC enforcement proceedings under the SOX
rules. Most important, all of these rules and enforcement mechanisms
require a finding of fault on the part of the lawyer-e.g. that the lawyer did
not follow the rule-to impose a sanction. This lawyer regulation regime
would be much more effective if lawyers, including those not at fault, had
an economic incentive to do their best to assure that clients follow the law,
particularly in situations where the clients might become insolvent. The
conditional fee and fee disgorgement mechanism we propose here provide
that incentive. A conditional fee and fee disgorgement mechanism could be
enacted by regulation; it also, however, could be voluntarily adopted by
boards of directors, perhaps as a result of shareholder activism directed to
that end.
II. THE SKEWED INCENTIVES OF BANKERS
An important cause of the financial crisis was badly-understood low-
quality financial instruments conceived and marketed as high-quality, and
financial techniques that ingeniously concealed deeply flawed finances;
both were crafted by bankers who were richly compensated for doing so.
This banker behavior is not uncommon or new. Enron provides a plethora
of examples. It used novel and complex techniques crafted by bankers (and
lawyers) to create a wholly false financial appearance. One banker
described to another banker Enron's reaction to a technique his bank had
developed: "Enron loves these deals as they are able to hide debt from their
equity analysts because they (at the very least) book it as deferred
rev[enue] or (better yet) bury it in their trading liabilities., 8
In some cases, such as Enron and more recently, when bankers helped
Greece hide significant amounts of debt, bankers engaged in or aided and
abetted concealment. 9 In other cases, bankers structured, marketed and sold
7 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before
the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2011).
8 The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron's Collapse: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. of Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.
232 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting email from one Chase banker to another,
November 11, 1998).
9 See, e.g., Beat Balzli, How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece Mask its True Debt,
DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010, 6:55 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0, 1518,druck-676634,00.html (discussing
Goldman's transactions for Greece), and Claire Hill, Why Did the Rating Agencies Do
Such A Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities? 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010)
(discussing concealment in the case of Enron).
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subprime securities and credit default swaps, with little regard for the risk
to their customers, their banks, and to some extent, themselves.
Financial institutions can be difficult clients for securities and banking
lawyers precisely because the economic incentives of the persons running
those institutions are skewed toward risk taking, and away from the
conservative approach with which lawyers often are most comfortable.
Financial institutions are run by people who can take enormous risks on the
institutions' behalf and profit personally when those risks pay off, yet have
no personal liability for the institutions' debts. We have elsewhere
considered how banker behavior might be improved. 10 We have proposed
that senior managers in financial institutions should have some personal
liability if their institutions become insolvent. 1 We made two specific
proposals: (1) that highly-compensated bankers would be subject to
personal liability up to all but a few million dollars of their assets, and/or
(2) that such bankers would receive some proportion of their compensation
in stock for which additional payment (an "assessment") could be required.
Thus, if the financial institution became insolvent, bankers would be
required to make payments to the institution for the benefit of its creditors.
Our personal liability proposal would allow bankers to keep some of their
assets even if their financial institution's creditors were not repaid in full;
thus, it is more lenient than the unlimited personal liability regime that
prevailed when most investment banks were general partnerships up
through the 1980s. 12 Our proposal would, we think, bring back some of the
conservatism and sound judgment that used to be associated with
investment banking and financial institutions generally.
III. THE LAWYERS
What can be done about lawyers? How can we minimize their
willingness to aid irresponsible bankers in structuring and selling
problematic financial instruments (such as subprime securities constructed
of defective mortgages) and techniques (such as debt-concealment
techniques)?
Lawyers help structure transactions and write the necessary disclosure;
they also provide legal opinions that say that their clients' transactions will
10 Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1173 (2010) ("Imposing genuine downside risk through [various] vehicles for personal
liability may be the best way to make bankers approach risk in a manner that reflects
the potential for externalities of the sort the crisis has so dramatically demonstrated.").
Id. at 1174.
1 Id. at 1189-92.
2 d. at 1187.
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have the legal effects that the clients desire. Throughout this process, they
are giving advice as to what the law requires. Difficulties arise when what
is contemplated is aggressive or even arguably deceptive.
Clients typically want to structure their securities to obtain the most
favorable regulatory treatment possible. Lawyers have sometimes become
involved in transactions involving securities that can be "all things to all
people"--debt to the taxing authorities, equity to rating agencies, etc.13 As
discussed below, these arbitrage opportunities are controversial: some
people may consider them unobjectionable, but others may feel, especially
if many regimes are being arbitraged, that a transaction goes too far.
Lawyers also may help issuers with strategies to improve financial
appearance. An issuer might want to appear to have very little debt; it
might want to appear to have very few assets as well, in order to appear to
have a higher "return on assets." Thus, an issuer might "sell" income-
producing assets rather than borrowing money secured by those assets.
Lawyers would be involved in structuring these transactions, and are often
asked to give an opinion that the desired treatment is appropriate.
The applicable laws in these areas are often rule-based, and reward
creative envelope-pushing. Rules necessarily draw lines; clever structuring
gets a client on the desired side of the line. If a client does not want to
"own" an asset, the client leases the asset. Leasing cannot be identical to
ownership but for the label: for instance, the lease cannot be for the whole
useful life of the asset. A line is drawn (by the relevant authorities, tax or
accounting) at, say, 80%; the client leases the asset for 79% of its useful
life. Is this acceptable conduct or not? Reasonable people differ. There are
many other examples such as a "triple-dip lease:" a transaction where
elements of differing regimes are combined to give regulatory
advantages-'dips' in each regime. 14 The advantages tend to come from
different-one might say conflicting-characterizations. X and Y might
13 See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L. REv. 227 (2010)
for a discussion of regulatory arbitrage. The author defines regulatory arbitrage as "the
manipulation of a structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic
substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment." Id. at 230. As Fleischer notes,
regulatory arbitrage is "perfectly legal." Id. at 229.
14 One definition of "triple-dip lease" is: a lease that uses significant tax or
funding incentives from three sources, usually involving at least two countries. The
American Society of Appraisers Principles of Valuation, Student Manual, ME204:
Machinery and Equipment Valuation-Advanced Topics and Report Writing 121
(2005), available at
http://www.asaeduc.com/index.php?page=shop.getfile&file id=80&product id=1
9&option=com_virtuemart&Itemid=26 (change the name of the file downloaded
from index.php to index.zip and then unzip the file ME204stu122905.pdf); see also
Christian Broderson et al., Germany Sees the First Stirrings of an Appetite, 2
INT'L TAX REV., no. 9, Supp., Sept. 1991, at 35, 40 (describing how double or
triple dip leasing can be achieved in Germany).
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both, for instance, count as owners of the same asset. Another example
involves financial instruments intended to obtain favorable
characterizations from regulators and quasi-regulators such as rating
agencies. As described in a publication by a leading San Francisco law
firm, Morrison and Foerster:
JPMorgan Securities structured a winning product with CENts, Capital
Efficient Notes. In July 2006, we represented the underwriters, led by
JPMorgan, in the first CENts transaction for Morrison & Foerster client
Capital One Financial Corporation. CENts represents a real innovation in
hybrids. It was the attainment of what bankers have referred to as the
Holy Grail-a hybrid that qualifies for D-basket equity credit from
ratings agencies, qualifies for Tier 1 capital treatment for bank holding
company issuers, and permits issuers to make tax-deductible interest
payments. 
15
Going further, some transactions would seem to have as their entire
purpose the tax or accounting treatment they permit. A continuum can be
drawn, with transactions done purely to achieve a regulatory or quasi-
regulatory purpose such as reducing taxes or improving financial
appearance at one end and, at the other end, transactions with a
straightforward business purpose, 16 done without regard to regulatory or
other costs, and accounting treatment. Many-probably most-transactions
are somewhere in between. While non-wealthy individuals in their daily
lives engage in transactions without regard to regulatory and like costs with
some regularity, businesses generally do not; no matter what kind of
transaction they are doing, they typically take into account minimization of
tax and other costs, as well as the most advantageous accounting
treatment.' 7 To restate the question asked above: how far will they go?
How far should they go? If they err and go too far-i.e. break the law-
who should have to pay for that mistake?
In some cases, banks and other clients go too far, with the help of their
lawyers-too far for society's comfort and too far in the eyes of the law.
Sometimes there is technical compliance with the particular laws that
lawyers are asked to opine on, but other legal obligations-such as general
disclosure obligations to investors-are violated. When this occurs, the
15 Hybrids: A Case Study: Saving Tax Dollars Makes CENts, MORRISON &
FOERESTER LLP, www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Cents.pdf.
16 We are mindful of the difficulties in articulating, much less applying these
concepts. See Fleischer, supra note 13, at 257 for a discussion of anti-abuse doctrines
in tax such as "economic substance" and "business purpose" that have attempted to do
so with pretty dismal results. But for purposes of our account, appealing to common-
sense interpretations of this language suffices.
17 We suspect that few people really oppose all efforts by corporations to minimize
their tax liability or improve their financial appearance-the problem is when they go
too far.
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lawyers who blessed a transaction bear part of the blame and should
perhaps bear part of the cost.
One of the most notorious transactions at issue in the financial crisis was
Lehman Brothers' Repo 105.18 In Repo 105, lawyers assisted Lehman with
its efforts to conceal $50 billion in debt on its quarterly balance sheets.
Lehman sold some of its lower-quality assets to other financial institutions
for cash, which it used to pay down debt at the end of each quarter. But the
"sales" and the "repayments" were temporary, to be unwound a few days
later. Even though Lehman and the counterparty agreed that the
transaction would be soon unwound, English law apparently allowed it to
be treated as a "sale" if the assets were valued at 105% or more of the cash
"paid" for them. It did not matter that the parties contemplated that
substantially equivalent assets would be transferred back to Lehman and
the cash returned a few days later.19 Lehman could not find New York
lawyers who would agree to characterize the transaction as a sale under
United States law, but Linklaters in London was willing to opine that the
sale coupled with a repurchase agreement was a true sale under English
law. 20 To accomplish its aim, Lehman had to transfer the securities
involved to London (this transaction no doubt was done with the
knowledge if not the assistance of United States lawyers). In London, the
transaction was executed through LBIE, Lehman's European broker-dealer
in London. It was reported to Lehman's auditors in the United States as a
true sale under English law-something a hyper-technical reading of the
rules could be stretched to support-and recorded as such on Lehman's
consolidated balance sheet for its quarterly report. After the transaction was
unwound, it could be repeated at the end of the next quarter and so on.
Substantial fees were paid to the counterparty each time, all for only one
apparent purpose: dressing up Lehman's quarterly balance sheet to look
better than it actually was.
There is no mention in the Linklaters opinion of the reason why Lehman
wanted to do the transaction. There is no mention of the fact that even if the
transaction was a true sale under U.K. law, there was still a risk that
Lehman Brothers could violate U.S. securities laws if it reported quarterly
financial results based on the transaction without also telling its investors in
the United States that Lehman Brothers contemplated unwinding the
18 Report of Exam'r at 783-86, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555
(JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Mar. 11,2011).
19 Id.
20 See id. app. 17 at 20, 31 (Linklaters Letter to Lehman Brothers International
(Europe) on May 31, 2006) (reading in part as follows: "Subject to the qualifications
set out in this opinion, in respect of each Transaction, following the transfer by Seller
to Buyer of the Purchased Securities, in our opinion, Seller will have disposed of its
entire proprietary interest in the Purchased Securities by way of sale.").
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transaction shortly thereafter. There is no mention in the opinion letter that
Lehman Brothers' senior management should at least tell Lehman
Brothers' board of directors about the transaction and its purpose.
Lehman engaged in Repo 105 to falsely improve its financial
appearance. Lehman "sold" some assets (for amounts in the tens of billions
of dollars) and used the proceeds to "pay off' liabilities. But the "sales"
were actually borrowings-Lehman was to repurchase the assets it had
purportedly sold, at higher prices several days later, something not
reflected on its balance sheet.
An article on Repo 105 discussed the unsuccessful search for a New
York law firm, the subsequent choice of the well-regarded English firm
Linklaters, and the substance of the opinion given:
When Lehman first designed Repo 105 in 2001, however, there was
one catch. The firm couldn't get any American law firms to sign off on
the aggressive accounting, namely that these transactions were true sales
instead of what amounted to the parking of assets. From the firm's own
Repo 105 accounting policy document, according to the report:
Repos generally cannot be treated as sales in the United States
because lawyers cannot provide a true sale opinion under U.S. law.
Enter Linklaters, which grounded its legal brief in English, rather than
American, law. The firm explicitly said: "This opinion is limited to
English law as applied by the English courts and is given on the basis
that it will be governed by and construed in accordance with English
law."
Otherwise, Linklaters provided Lehman with exactly what it wanted
to hear. The law firm decreed in its briefs, at least as outlined in the 2006
iteration obtained by Mr. Valukas [the Bankruptcy Examiner], that intent
matters. If two parties intend to exchange assets for cash, and then later
the party receiving the assets decides to hand back "equivalent assets
(such as securities of the same series and nominal value) rather than the
very assets that were originally delivered," that amounts to a sale. 2'
Contrast the foregoing description to a sale by an ordinary individual.
Smith sells his house to Jones, who wants the house. Smith walks away
with money, and Jones has the house. Assume Smith had debt equal to the
amount of the house proceeds, which he repays with the house proceeds.
Jones may or may not keep the house, but neither he nor Smith would
contemplate that he would resell it to Smith-after all, if Smith wanted the
house, why would he sell it? Someone looking to lend money to Smith
after he sells the house will see in Smith's financial statements no house
21 Michael J. De La Merced & Julia Werdigier, The Origins of Lehman's 'Repo





and lower debt. Someone looking to lend money to Jones after he buys the
house will see in his financial statements the house and less money (or an
obligation to pay the bank). What Lehman wanted with Repo 105 was for
people to see the financial statements with no "house"-in fact, assets of
very questionable value-and less debt; Lehman intended, however, to
quickly repurchase the assets for more money than it had been "paid" for
them. Anyone looking at Lehman's financial statements during the period
when the assets had been sold would-and did-get a profoundly false
picture of Lehman's financials.
Even relatively unsophisticated individuals structure some, and certainly
their more consequential, transactions to minimize adverse tax and
regulatory consequences. For instance, the availability of a mortgage
interest deduction encourages people to buy homes rather than rent. But
when structuring is tantamount to deception, something is amiss. We take
no position as to whether there is 'acceptable' planning of this type12 -- our
position here is simply that whether because of differences in degree or in
kind from what is acceptable, certain types of lawyer behavior need to be
constrained. Business clients use lawyers to help them with structuring
transactions and in particular, with minimizing costs and maximizing
benefits (such as accounting appearances). Whether or not the lawyers are
instigators, they are necessary participants in transactions and share
responsibility for the outcome of those transactions.23 Constraining
lawyers-or creating incentives for lawyers to constrain themselves-
should help limit this behavior.
IV. THE CONDITIONAL FEE
Contingent fees (usually based on a percentage of a judgment or a
transaction) are common in the United States, but prohibited in many other
24jurisdictions. In some of those jurisdictions, such as England, conditional
fees are used to align the lawyers' interests with those of the client. 25 If the
client succeeds in accomplishing its objectives the lawyer is paid a fixed
fee; if the client does not succeed the lawyer is not paid all or most of the
fee. Because the fee is conditional, it is usually higher than a fee that must
be paid regardless of the results obtained.
22 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV.
215, 220-22 (2002) (arguing that there is no "right" to do tax planning).
23 See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 511-12 (1994).
24 See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions
or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 626-27 (1995) (discussing
contingent fees in the United States).
25 See id. at 627 n.10 (discussing the conditional fee in England and otherjurisdictions that prohibit contingent fees).
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We propose that fees for securities lawyers representing financial
institutions and perhaps some bank regulatory lawyers be conditional. If the
client complies with the law during the legal representation, the fee is paid.
If the client does not comply and yet remains solvent, the fee still is paid-
the client should not be permitted to avoid paying the lawyer because of its
own misconduct (if the lawyer truly neglected his duties, the client can sue
for malpractice). If, however, the client violates the laws in connection with
which the lawyer has been retained and becomes insolvent within a period
of three years, the lawyer is not paid any amounts still due and must
disgorge for the benefit of the client's creditors legal fees paid during the
period of noncompliance. The lawyer's fault is irrelevant, although the
lawyer can work hard to protect a conditional fee by making sure that the
client takes steps to comply with the law, particularly if there is a risk of
future insolvency. While a lawyer might seek to protect a portion of his or
her fees by delaying client insolvency, there is a limited amount lawyers
can do to stop a client from sliding into insolvency other than what they are
supposed to do, which is to get senior management, directors, and perhaps
even the outside creditors to focus on rectifying the situation. In any event,
a lawyer who cannot prevent either illegal client conduct or client
insolvency will end up doing a substantial amount of legal work for free.
We also propose that lawyers writing opinions relied upon by a client's
accountants be required to disgorge fees if 1) the client subsequently
becomes insolvent, 2) the lawyers' opinion was relied upon by the
accountants, and 3) a causal connection is established between the opinion
and the accountants' improper certification of financial statements (this part
of our proposal would require an adjudication-probably by a court-
before a fee disgorgement could be ordered). A showing of causal
connection with the insolvency would not be required.
Although the category of lawyers who should receive conditional fees
can be expanded (either by regulation or by private agreement with a
client), we suggest starting with lawyers who are "practicing before the
SEC"-a term broadly defined under SEC rules to include the provision of
any securities compliance advice 26 -and lawyers such as Linklaters in the
Repo 105 transaction, who provide legal opinions that are relied upon by
the auditors of a client that is a publicly held company, whether or not they
practice before the SEC. Some banking and other regulatory lawyers could
be included as well, either through voluntary private arrangements with
clients or through regulations promulgated by the relevant banking
regulators. This proposal might be enacted by regulation. But we must be
26 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before
the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (2011).
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realistic: such a regulation is probably unlikely. What may be more
realistic, though, is private adoption. Some client boards of directors might
ask lawyers for a conditional fee premised upon a combination of client
compliance and solvency, both as a way of improving the quality of
services from lawyers charged with compliance work, and, if the
arrangement is publicized, as a way to reassure investors, counterparties,
and regulators that the client wants to do everything possible to assure its
own compliance and solvency. And shareholder activists might submit
proposals urging adoption of conditional fee and disgorgement
arrangements.
A conditional fee approach avoids many of the difficulties present in a
fault-based malpractice regime. A fault-based regime requires finding
counsel to sue other lawyers; it also requires establishing fault or failure to
adhere to the prevailing standard of care, and loss causation. Moreover,
fault-based regimes may allow for the in pari delicto defense, under which
professional service providers for a failed entity can attribute wrongdoing
of their client's officers and directors to a trustee representing the now-
bankrupt client's creditors.27 Civil litigation is in any event unpredictable
and in all events costly, further limiting the ex ante motivations of lawyers
to avoid bad behavior, and the ex post ability to recover for lawyer bad
behavior.
While we do not suggest replacing the malpractice regime with a
conditional fee, we believe that a conditional fee could be useful for
avoiding the type of loophole lawyering that brings clients too close to
legal lines and too close to insolvency, a combination likely to injure
persons other than the client, including its creditors, and to potentially
cause harm to the financial system as a whole. The conditional fee provides
an additional incentive for cautious lawyering without many of the costs
that would be incurred from an alternative approach of making legal
malpractice suits easier to win or increasing the size of judgments against
lawyers.
The conditional fee also fills an enforcement gap in bar association
regulation of the legal profession. As noted above, very few bar
disciplinary proceedings are brought against lawyers for advice they give
clients about compliance with securities laws and banking regulations.
Many disciplinary authorities do not fully understand these practice areas,
and have difficulty determining when lawyers have been incompetent 28 or
have assisted with a client crime or fraud.29 Disciplinary authorities are
27 See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010).
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (describing compliance).29 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009) (prohibiting lawyer
assistance with client crime or fraud).
Vol. 1:1
OF THE CONDITIONAL FEE
reluctant to pursue charges of lawyer malfeasance except in the rare cases
when the lawyer has been subject to an administrative sanction by a
government agency or a criminal conviction.3 °
Regulation of lawyers by the SEC or bank regulators is somewhat more
vigorous because these agencies are experts in the relevant area. Congress
gave the SEC new powers to regulate lawyers in SOX, and the SEC's
professional responsibility rules have addressed some areas of
responsibility such as reporting corporate client noncompliance up the
ladder to boards of directors. The more general responsibilities of securities
lawyers to assure client compliance with the law, are not, however,
addressed in the SEC's rules. The SEC rules also do not address the
consequences for lawyers who render legal opinions blessing transactions
despite warning signs that those transactions are part of a plan to deceive
investors. Furthermore, the rules contain confusing language defining when
evidence of a violation has to be reported up the ladder. 3' The rules also
only apply to lawyers representing issuers (lawyers representing
underwriters and other financial advisors are excluded unless the lawyers
represent these entities as issuers of their own securities), and there is a
broad carve-out for foreign lawyers (it is debatable, for example, whether
Linklaters was practicing before the Commission when its London office
issued the Repo 105 opinion letter with a specific disclaimer saying the
letter was not providing advice under U.S. securities laws, even though the
opinion also said that Lehman's auditors would rely upon the opinion in
blessing the financial statements attached to its 10K filed with the SEC).32
In any event, there have been few, if any, SEC proceedings against lawyers
for violating the SEC's SOX rules even in situations where it is clear that
the rules do apply.
We do not propose that the SEC rules for securities lawyers be
abandoned-indeed they should probably be expanded to address new
30 This concern about lack of enforcement by state bar disciplinary committees
motivated one of the authors of this article to urge the federally mandated up-the-ladder
reporting requirement that eventually was adopted in Section 307 of SOX. See Richard
W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225, 261 (1996).
" See 17 C.F.R. §205.2(e) (defining evidence of a material violation as "credible
evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur").
32 See id. § 205.2(a)(2)(ii) (stating that the definition of an attorney appearing
and practicing before the Commission "[d]oes not include an attorney who ... is a
non-appearing foreign attorney"). Other difficulties with pursing Linklaters under
the SEC's SOX rules include that it may not have been apparent at the time-
particularly to Linklaters-that Lehman was violating the securities laws (although
serious inquiry into the purpose of the Repo 105 transaction would likely have
revealed that Lehman was trying to dress up its balance sheet).
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areas such as legal opinions33 -but we do not believe these rules, alone or
in combination with the legal malpractice and lawyer discipline regimes,
provide sufficient incentive for lawyers to be proactive in assuring client
compliance in those situations where persons other than the client-e.g.
creditors and the financial system as a whole-are most likely to be
harmed. Unlike these fault-based regimes, the conditional fee that we
propose focuses on lawyer compensation and compensates the attorney
based on an important component of the results obtained for the client,34
which is the client's compliance with the law, at least in those situations
where the client is at risk of insolvency. If the client does not comply and
becomes insolvent, the lawyer does not get paid.
The conditional fee we propose is principally an incentive mechanism,
not a way to compensate creditors (an issuer's legal fees are likely to be a
small percentage of creditors' overall losses in a situation such as the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). Nonetheless, disgorgement of conditional
fees may be the only recovery creditors get from the issuer's lawyers. As
discussed above, private securities fraud suits cannot be brought under
federal law against aiders and abettors of securities fraud, or even co-
conspirators, and the definition of the primary violator is exceedingly
narrow. " In some states, lawyers sued by a bankruptcy trustee can raise
the defense of in pari delicto, claiming that the conduct of the defunct
debtor's officers and directors are attributable to the bankruptcy estate,
thereby blocking most suits for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty
against professional service providers.36 Finally, the SEC has to date not
used the SOX rules or any other securities laws to require disgorgement of
fees or other payments by lawyers except in situations where the lawyers
themselves are found to have violated the securities laws.
This conditional fee disgorgement rule, like our proposed personal
33 The SEC's rules should require that lawyers opining on large transactions report
basic facts about those transactions to issuer boards of directors, unless the chief legal
officer or outside securities counsel has reviewed the transaction and affirmatively
opined that the issuer is in compliance with US securities laws. The SEC should also
clarify that these and other SOX Section 307 rules apply to any lawyer providing an
opinion or other work product to be relied upon by the issuer's auditors. Finally,
lawyers providing opinions should have affirmative duties to investigate transactions to
satisfy themselves that they are not assisting a client in committing a fraud. The extent
of required investigation should depend on the nature of the transaction.
34 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2009) (listing factors to be
used in determining the reasonableness of legal fees, including the results
obtained).
31 See Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301-02
(2011); Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 153, 166-67
(2008); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177-80
(1994); supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
36 See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950, 955-57 (N.Y. 2010).
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liability rule for investment bankers discussed briefly above,37 would
impose strict liability, unrelated to a showing of the lawyers' culpability.
Lawyers would be required to accept responsibility for the outcome of their
legal representation in those situations where bad outcomes are particularly
likely. Because only fees would be lost and personal liability would not be
imposed on lawyers absent a finding of fault, this proposal is not as
onerous as our personal liability proposal for investment bankers. There is,
however, a common theme: in this regime of personal and professional
responsibility the "it's not my fault" argument would be irrelevant.
Will a conditional fee discourage lawyers from taking on some financial
services firms and other issuers of securities as clients? Perhaps, unless
lawyers are compensated for the fact that the fee is conditional. Legal
representation in securities and banking matters would probably be of
higher quality under the conditional fee regime, but it would be more
expensive, especially for clients that take bigger risks. 38
What if, in the course of a representation, the client increases its risky
behavior or otherwise comes closer to insolvency? Will lawyers respond to
increased risk of client noncompliance and insolvency in the middle of a
representation by raising the conditional fee rather than addressing the
underlying problem? Perhaps clients should be required to report material
changes in their fee arrangements with their lawyers during the course of a
representation on a Form 8-K (this is the same SEC form used to report
developments such as resignation of accountants and the reasons behind
them in Item 401; the same form could require reporting changes in fee
arrangements with lawyers and the reasons behind them).39
V. CONCLUSION
We may no longer be in the midst of a full-blown financial crisis, but our
economy is scarcely healthy. Indeed, we risk entering into a second "dip"
17 See Hill & Painter, supra note 10.
38 Perhaps a rule requiring the conditional fee should contain an exception for smaller
clients whose legal fees are already large compared with their market capitalization
(unlike Lehman Brothers these smaller institutions are also unlikely to pose a systemic
risk to the economy). For larger financial institutions, however, more effective and
more conservative-if marginally more expensive-legal representation is worth it.
39 Even if the specifics of the legal representation are not disclosed under client
confidentiality rules, investors as well as regulators should be entitled to see the
conditional fee increase reflected in the client's securities filings. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009) (describing confidentiality as well as common law
governing the attorney-client privilege); see also, U.S. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619
F.2d 9080, 985-96 (1980) (discussing federal common law attorney client privilege).
Information about lawyers' fees generally is not considered to be privileged (although
the nature of the legal services sometimes is privileged), and basic information about
legal fees probably should not be kept confidential when the client is a public company.
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or recession. Unemployment remains very high, and the housing market is
deeply depressed. The stock market remains volatile. Many laws and
regulations have been adopted in response to the crisis; there have been
other changes as well, including some changes in norms and behavior.
There are debates as to how well the law changes will work, and how much
we have learned about what to do and what not to do; few if any observers,
though, think that we have solved the problem. Indeed, many
commentators are suggesting that the next crisis is not far off; some are
suggesting it will be even worse than the crisis just past.
Banker behavior was a significant cause of the crisis. We have argued
elsewhere that existing law, including the law as changed in response to the
crisis, does not sufficiently address banker behavior; we have argued that
bankers should bear more liability for their banks' excessive risk-taking. 40
Here, we briefly consider lawyer behavior. Lawyers designed many of
the exotic financial instruments that caused the crisis, and provided
securities and other compliance work to large financial institutions that in
some cases were not complying with the law. Lawyers blessed transactions
such as Repo 105 that helped conceal these problems from investors.
Lawyers should accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions,
not only in a fault based liability or disciplinary regime, but also by
sometimes not getting paid for the work they do when that work does not
accomplish its objective-i.e. when compliance work does not cause the
client to comply with the law-and the client also becomes insolvent.
Our conditional fee proposal will not prevent all loophole lawyering.
The client may be close to the line, but remain on the "right side"--our
proposal only addresses violations of law, not aggressive interpretations.
Our proposal also does not address violations of law that cause dramatic
losses for shareholders or other parties such as customers, counterparties
and investors, but do not result in the client's insolvency. For these reasons
the conditional fee is only part of the solution to the problem of loophole
lawyering and lax compliance oversight by lawyers. An effective legal
malpractice liability regime, a more diligent lawyer disciplinary regime,
and more assertive oversight of lawyers by the SEC and bank regulators,
will also be necessary. In a limited range of circumstances, however, the
conditional fee could realign lawyer incentives toward more conservative
assessment of risk than their clients' assessment. Conditional fees thus
should help some banking lawyers and securities lawyers do a better job
representing their clients.
We think our proposal can play an important role in preventing, or at
least limiting the effect of, future financial crises. Problematic transactions
40 Hill & Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests, supra note 10.
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should become more difficult to do because lawyers will be less willing to
help, particularly if a transaction poses a risk of both legal violation and
future insolvency. Lawyers who fear loss of conditional legal fees under a
no-fault regime in addition to their existing exposure to malpractice
liability and other sanctions when fault can be shown, would presumably
conduct more due diligence, and might refuse to participate in transactions
unless problematic elements were eliminated. Lawyers would be
encouraged to err on the side of caution. The benefits of our proposal come
at a cost: fewer transactions and higher legal fees. But on balance, this cost
seems worthwhile.
This proposal is less ambitious and hence perhaps more likely to be
effectively implemented than our proposal regarding bankers' personal
liability. While we hope that a conditional fee regime, whether
implemented by financial regulators, state bar ethics committees or by
private parties themselves, could motivate lawyers to limit or even
eliminate their involvement in problematic client behavior, much more
needs to be done. Our broader conclusion is that the ethos that prioritizes
and rewards financial and legal risk taking needs to change. Our hope, with
this proposal, our proposal regarding bankers, and other reforms we are
suggesting elsewhere,41 is that such an ethos will begin to change in the
financial services industry, and be supplanted by an ethos of professional
and personal responsibility.
41 In a book tentatively titled THE PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF INVESTMENT BANKERS, we will discuss several suggested reforms, including
personal liability of investment bankers for firm debts, limiting compensation for
investment bankers on the premise that investment banking plays a facilitating rather
than a primary role in economic development and is not the place for either excessive
innovation or big risk-big reward business decisions, promoting regional investment
banking to reinforce social and economic ties with clients and other economic actors
affected by bankers' actions, and promoting specialized investment banking that
focuses on services such as underwriting securities or retail brokerage to increase the
value of reputation for high quality services rather than the current emphasis on
propriety trading in an investment bank's own account.
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